Solving the tragedy of the commons

Tragedy of the Commons & Industrial Ecology

Last SSPM session, we were confronted with our more evil side. Where we as industrial ecologists tend to see ourselves as moral human beings, conscious of our environment and the people around us, we were proved to be the bad guys ourselves.

In the fishery game, many teams (including mine I’m afraid) played ‘defect’, by fishing more fish than the sustainable amount of four. Within five rounds we had completely emptied the sea. But we did not even defect in a rational way - we went for five fish. The only rational strategy would have been to play 50 in the first round, since we would play a maximum of 8 rounds (so if all teams played ‘cooperate’, we would have caught 4*8 = 32 fishes). Of course, this strategy would only work if the other teams were to go for a more modest start and not empty the sea before us.

In an infinite game, this defect tactic would be completely useless. Nevertheless, human beings do not seem to be very well-equipped to reason on the long run, especially when we consider infinity. A growing population density, combined with the development of international trade, reduced direct feedback loops between human beings and nature. Through the mechanism of competition, human beings are actively encouraged to produce more and therefore to use more resources.

Governance

Vast population growth combined with the increasing depletion of natural resources have lead to degraded ecosystems, for example caused by fishing or deforestation. These problems are often referred to as a tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968). The only way to overcome the tragedy of the commons, Hardin describes, is by accepting that complete freedom is a illusion.

Handing over freedom so that we can share common goods in an honest way is fundamental to the way today’s society is organized. We pay taxes (hand over freedom) and in return, the government ensures health care, education, drinking water and clean air. So, to prevent an empty sea, we should implement some form of governance in the fishery game we played in class.

Culture
We started that same lecture by creating an in-group and an out-group. Signalling is one of the main mechanisms that is used in nature to make a distinction between friend and foe, for example with odour or in behaviour (Krebs & Davies, 1997). During the first half an hour of class, students who came in too late were forced to either stand or sit on the table. Clear public ‘punishment’ for their defecting behaviour. By differentiating between ‘accepted behaviour’ (in-group) and ‘alien behaviour’ (out-group), we in fact started to develop a culture. Schein (1968) defines culture as a pattern of shared assumptions, that are in some way formed within a group, if they deal with collective problems. Culture needs to be reinforced, so that it becomes a pattern.

Overcoming the Tragedy of the Commons

So, in order to overcome the tragedy of the commons, we need to establish governance, that is enforced by a culture, or at least the feeling to be part of some sort of in-group, and defecting behaviour should be signalled and actively discouraged.

Therefore, I propose the following measures:

1.       Before the fishing season starts, all ‘team captains’ will come together and seek for common ground

2.       Based on these common values, a cooperation will be established

3.       From each team, 1 member will take place in a cooperation board, which will set up rules

4.       From each team, 1 member will take place in an audit board, they will be paid from general contribution to the cooperation, to ensure their independence

5.       As a fishing boat returns from the sea, it’s catch will be checked, if it’s more than four fish, there will be 2 consequences:

a.       The boat is no longer allowed to use the logo on their boat (signalling defecting behaviour)

b.      The boat is excluded from fishing the next year

The only way in which these measures will work is if ‘defecting’ is not just discouraged by rules, but also by all members of the cooperation. In a cooperation, ‘cooperate’ should be a cultural norm, so that defecting leads to serious social consequences as well.

Relating my solution to Colby’s paradigms, my solution is an example of resource management, in which economic growth should be balanced with natural resources. Even though humans are central in this paradigm, eco-efficiency based regulations prevent ecosystem depletion.

As there is no direct influence from a central government in my solution, the governance type can be characterized as private interest governance (Boons, 2008). In the end, all fishermen are better off with a healthy fish population, so there is a clear common interest. Also, since we are discussing a small community, research has showed that in many regional cases top-down legislation from a central government can have a negative impact (Andersson & Ostrom, 2008), whereas bottom-up governance can be based on extensive local knowledge.

In short, I think all teams combined should start building a culture, in which ‘defecting’ is simply not an option. By creating a cooperation, common ground can become institutionalized and part of the deep underlying assumptions of the fishermen’s culture. A cooperation board can continuously improve rules and regulations and an audit board can actively discourage any ‘defecting’ fishermen. A tight social network can be an answer to the tragedy of the commons.

References

- Andersson, K. and Ostrom, E. (2008). Analyzing decentralized resource regimes from a polycentric perspective, Policy Sciences 41: 71-93.

- Boons, F.A. (2008) Self-Organization and Sustainability: The Emergence of a Regional Industrial Ecology, Emergence: Complexity and Organization 10(2).

- Hardin, G. (1968) The Tragedy of the Commons, Science 162(3859 , Dec. 13, 1968), pp. 1243-1248.

- Krebs, J.R. & Davies, N.B. (1998) Behavioural evology: An evolutionary approach, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford

- Schein, E. (1996) Three Cultures of Management: The Key to Organizational Learning, Sloan Management Review; 38(1): 9-20.

Comment, 30-12-2014
The tragedy of the commons is in fact a collective action problem, where the outcome of individual behaviour is positive for the individual, but negative for the collective if all individuals produce this behaviour. In rereading this blogpost, I feel that I miss some of the complexity of such an issue, as my solution builds on the assumption that, once all fishermen start talking, they will agree on a collective policy.

It may be more realistic to add another governance structure: that of a local or national government. The main governance structure could still be the cooperation board, but the progress of the community should be audited by this local or national government. This will make sure that the fish population remains high on the agenda and it will offer an extra tool to control defecting behaviour within the cooperation.

I feel these two governance structures combined can establish a community in which the fish population will stabilize at a sustainable size.